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This paper uses the Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) methodology in order to estimate whether 
“the cycle is the trend” in 23 emerging markets and 22 OECD economies. These estimates 
are then used to test whether procyclical fiscal policy in emerging countries is due to 
persistent shocks to per-capita GDP. We find support for this hypothesis. While both 
developed and emerging countries have a procyclical policy for investment expenditure, 
procyclicality is evident in emerging countries also for government consumption and 
transfers. Over the period of increasing globalization after the 1990s, these are signs of a 
reduction in the extent of procyclical expenditure policy in emerging countries. We also 




Este trabajo utiliza la metodología de Aguiar y Gopinath (2007) para estimar si “el ciclo es 
la tendencia” en 23 economías emergentes y 22 países de la OCDE. Se utilizan estas 
estimaciones para probar si la política fiscal procíclica en las economías emergentes se 
debe a shocks persistentes al PIB per cápita, encontrando evidencia a favor de esta 
hipótesis. Mientras se encuentran políticas de gasto en inversión procíclicas tanto en las 
economías emergentes como en las desarrolladas, la prociclicalidad es también evidente en 
las transferencias y del consumo de gobierno de las economías emergentes. Después de los 
noventa, período caracterizado por una creciente globalización, existen señales de 
reducción de la intensidad de la política de gasto procíclica en economías emergentes. 
Finalmente, se encuentra que en los países con mayores niveles de inversión extranjera 
directa, la prociclicalidad es más suave. 
                                                 
  This paper was presented during the XIV Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, “Fiscal Policy and 
Macroeconomic Performance,” held on 21-22 October 2010 in Santiago. We thank to our discussant Sofía Bauducco, the 
editors, and participants of the Conference for helpful comments. Also, we are thankful to Gila Weinberger for 
outstanding research assistance. Strawczynski: Research Department, Bank of Israel, email: 




In recent years economic research on fiscal policy has shown that while developed 
economies tend to run countercyclical fiscal policies, Latin American countries had been 
characterized by procyclical policies. Some of the explanations given to this phenomenon 
is that high external debt causes severe constraints on the capability of achieving new 
loans, and consequently countries are constrained to cut budget deficits. Other 
explanations are related to optimal behavior against political constraints (Talvi and 
Vègh, 2005). In this paper we test a different channel, related to the characteristics of 
business cycles. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) found that in developing countries “the 
cycle is the trend”; i.e., in these countries business cycles turn to become persistent, and 
determine the fundamentals of economic performance of those countries. In particular, 
one possible channel is fiscal policy: in times of recessions (booms) the erratic character 
of the crisis (good times) forces developing economies to cut (increase) expenditures, 
acting procyclically. This procyclical behavior may characterize other sectors of the 
economy, far beyond fiscal policy reaction (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vègh, 2004). 
 
The recent renewed interest in cyclicality of fiscal policy is mainly empirical. This 
new empirical literature began with Galí (1994), Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994), and 
Fiorito (1997), who found that fiscal expenditures are counter-cyclical or a-cyclical in 
developed countries. In contrast Gavin and Perotti (1997) found that fiscal policy is 
highly pro-cyclical in Latin American countries. These findings led to much research that 
re-examined these findings and corroborated them to a large extent. 
 
Lane (2003) shows that cyclicality of fiscal policy varies significantly across 
categories and also across OECD countries, but in most advanced economies they are 
counter-cyclical. Arreaza, Sørensen, and Yosha (1999), Galí and Perotti (2003) and 
Strawczynski and Zeira (2009) find further support for counter-cyclical fiscal policy in 
EU and in OECD countries. Galí (2005) even finds that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical 
in all industrialized countries and that counter-cyclicality even intensified after 1991. 
Darby and Melitz (2007) find that social expenditures account for the vast majority of 
countercyclical fiscal policy. Fatás and Mihov (2001) find that most of the counter-
cyclicality of deficits in developed countries is a result of the automatic stabilizers. As 
mentioned above, the findings in developing countries are very different. Talvi and Vègh 
(2005) show, based on a large sample of less developed countries, that government 
spending and taxes are highly pro-cyclical. This finding is also corroborated by Akitoby 
et al. (2004), by Alesina and Tabellini (2005), and by Ilzetzki and Vègh (2008). The 
main explanation for this difference in fiscal policy between developed and less developed 
countries is that governments in less developed countries face credit constraints, which 
force them to cut expenditures during recessions. Recently other explanations were 
offered, based on political economy, as in Talvi and Vègh (2005), Alesina and Tabellini 
(2005) and Ilzetzki (2008). 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we characterize procyclicality of 
government expenditure against per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) shocks and 
describe the methodology for assessing whether “the cycle is the trend”. In section 3 we 
show empirical results on the relationship between “the cycle is the trend” variable and 
government expenditure, expenditure cuts during recessions and government expenditure 
composition (consumption, transfers and investment); we also test for a change in 
behavior after the nineties. In this section we additionally check whether procyclicality is 
milder for countries with high foreign direct investment (FDI), high international 2
reserves, low public debt and inclusion in emerging markets stock exchange index. 
Section 4 concludes and the appendices present our method for choosing the length of 
random walk component and moving averages of GDP per capita, sensitivity for the use 
of different instrumental variables under generalized methods of moments (GMM), 
Granger causality tests, sensitivity to country fixed effects, an Arellano-Bond type of 
specification, and a summary of our sources and definitions.  
 
2. PROCYCLICALITY OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AGAINST PERMANENT 
SHOCKS 
 
In order to study the impact of permanent shocks on fiscal policy variables we 
will concentrate mainly on expenditure. Ideally we would like to test also the impact on 
taxes and on the deficit. However, the straight interaction between the cycle and tax 
revenues, and thus the deficit, makes this mission difficult. Furthermore, the 
unavailability of data on statutory tax rates deters us from studying the impact on 
taxes. 
 
Similarly to Barro (1979), we consider output and real interest rate to be 
exogenous. However, opposed to Barro’s model we take the tax rate as given and assume 
that government expenditure is endogenous. The government chooses Gt (real 
government expenditure) in all periods (t=1,2,...) so as to maximize a utility function 






















where  r is an exogenous interest rate, Y is the exogenous level of output, g
* is the 
maximum level of government expenditure over output (G/Y), and g is its actual level.
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where    is the exogenous statutory tax rate and b0 is the ratio of initial general 
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1 This specification is parallel to Barro (1979), who stresses the tractability of choosing an 
homogeneous function for maximization, since g is expressed as percent of GDP.    3
The optimal solution deriving from equation 4 is to choose a smooth g in all 
periods.  
 
Before writing the solution, let us define the permanent value of a variable X 





















Plugging the optimal smooth value of G in the inter-temporal budget constraint, 
and taking the permanent value of output as defined in equation 5, we get: 
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This equation states that the tax rate is set to finance the permanent level of 
expenditure and the initial debt using the permanent level of output as the tax base. 
  
If there is an exogenous permanent shock on output, and given that debt and real 
interest rate are exogenous, the single way of restoring the equality would be to adjust 
government expenditure.
2 In a recession (expansion) the equality requires cutting (rising) 
expenditure; i.e. — procyclical fiscal policy. It is worth to note that this policy shall be 
similar for both developed and emerging economies. However, the difference among them 
may be based on: (i) the degree of permanent shocks: in emerging markets cycles may 
become persistent (“the cycle is the trend”), while in developed economies these shocks 
maybe purely transitory. If this is the case we expect fiscal policy to be acyclical (or 
countercyclical)
3 in developed economies, and procyclical in emerging markets; (ii) a 
different response to these shocks — which may differ as a consequence of the risk 
perception by economic agents. 
 
To calculate the variable representing the phenomenon “the cycle is the trend” 
we use the methodology adopted by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). While they used this 
methodology for Canada and Mexico, we extend the calculation to 22 developed 
economies and to 23 emerging countries.
4  
 






21 var( ), Kt t K Ky y  (6) 
 
2 Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) consider the case in which both the tax rate and government 
expenditure are endogenous. 
3 When shocks are transitory, it is easy to show that the optimal policy against these shocks is to 
run a countercyclical policy, which acts as an optimal device for smoothing. This point is formally 
shown in Strawczynski and Zeira (2009). 
4 The list of countries is shown in appendix F. There is no single accepted definition for emerging 
markets. Some well-known definitions are based on indexes (MSCI and FTSE) that include 
different lists of countries, and on The Economist list. In our sample 17 out the 22 countries are 
included in these lists, and 5 countries are not.  4
where   log( ) t y GDP  per capita at time t and K is the amount of lagged differences.
We then correct the sample variance for small sample bias, by including a degree of 
freedom correction term  ) 1 /( 	  K T T : 
 


























y   is the value of 
2
K  where 1  K . Thus, for all countries the value of equation 
8 at  1  K  is 1. 
 
This value is giving us the ratio between the long-term variability of output 
compared to the short term one, and thus it is providing us with measure of to what 
extent “the cycle is the trend”. The higher this coefficient, the higher countries are 
expected to be affected by changes in output. Figure 1 shows the result of this measure 
for the different countries. 
 
In order to compare the results internationally, we take the average value of this 
measure for each country (see appendix A for a discussion of this choice). We expect the 
value for developed markets to be lower than for emerging markets.
5 
                                                
5 In figure 1 we see that the pattern of procyclicality changes with K. It turns out that the 
pattern of procyclicality in emerging markets is very pronounced when K is between 9 and 11 (see 
figure A1 in appendix A for K=11).   5





















































































































Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa-Rica
Dominican Rep. Egypt Hungary India Indonesia Korea
Malaysia Mexico Morocco Pakistan Panama Peru
South Africa Thailand Turkey Uruguay Venezuela
 
Source: Own elaboration.6










































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In general, we see in figure 2 that emerging countries have a higher value of the 
random walk component: 12 countries are over the median (which equals 0.957), while 
11 are below. In developed countries: 12 countries are below the median and 10 above it. 
The average of all developed countries is 1.01 (and 0.95 excluding Ireland), compared to 
1.07 for emerging countries. 
 
This value is then multiplied with the sum of growth over three years (the reason 
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Figure 3 shows this formula applied for two developed countries and for two 
emerging countries. All four countries have similar and relatively (to other countries) low 
variance of the random walk component. Nevertheless, the erratic behavior in emerging 






















UK Switzerland Argentina Venezuela
 
Source: Own elaboration.   
 
In the regressions below we will use CITT as an independent variable in 
regressions on total government expenditure, government consumption, social transfers 
and subsidies, and capital expenditure. 
 




For estimating the CITT variable we use per-capita GDP at constant prices. 
Data for developed countries was taken from OECD Economic Outlook and OECD 
Historical Statistics. Data for emerging markets is taken from the Government Financial 
Statistics. Data relates to the General Government.  See appendix F for a detailed 
description of our sources and definitions. 
 
3.2 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
 
We estimate the following types of regressions:  
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where G is real government expenditure, deflated by GDP prices; CITT is “the cycle is 
the trend” variable as defined above; dlog(POP) is the population growth rate; POP15 
and  POP65 are the populations under 15 and over 65 years old, respectively, as a 
percentage of total population; K  is the average of the random walk component as 
explained above; RATIO refers to the ratio between GDP per capita (in PPP values) of 
the country and the GDP per capita (in PPP values) of  USA; EMERGING is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 for emerging countries and 0 otherwise; HyperInfl is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 when yearly inflation is over 100% over two or more consecutive  
years.  
 
We repeat these regressions in the framework of three panel models: a simple 
ordinary least squares regression with period fixed effects, an autoregressive model (AR) 
and a GMM model (with an AR process). Furthermore, we examine these models for 
different lengths of moving average of output (1 to 4 periods). For space considerations 
the tables below show only the results for three periods moving average of output using 
the GMM approach. 
 
The implementation of a GMM model requires choosing an instrumental variable 
that is correlated with the CITT variable and it is not correlated with government 
expenditure. For this purpose we use real exports, and additionally check the sensitivity 
of results to other instrumental variables (see appendix C). 
 
3.2.1 BUDGET CUTS 
 
Since in emerging countries fiscal policy is procyclical in hard times, it is 
particularly interesting to learn about budget cuts. Table 1 summarizes the number of 
budget cuts and whether they followed a recession period (which would indicate 
procyclical behavior), the amount of persistent budget cuts, and the depth of the budget 
cuts. 
 
We will estimate the following regression:  
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where 
 G  and 
 Y  are dummy variables that take the value 1 when government 











Table 1. B Budget Cuts (*). 




Average number of observations with a government 
budget cut.  5.7 6.8 
Average number of events (when real government 
expenditure was cut) as percent of total years available.  12.7 25.6 
Average number of persistent events (when government 
expenditure was cut two consecutive years or more) as 
percent of total years available (**).
 
5.5 10.2 
Average number of persistent events (two years or more) 
as percent of total number of events.  43.2 39.9 
Average number of persistent events (when government 
expenditure was cut three consecutive years or more) as 
percent of total years available. 
2.4 4.1 
Average number of persistent events (three years or 
more) as percent of total number of events.  19.2 16.1 
Average number of events with parallel reduction in 
growth as percent of total number of events.  6.4 30.1 
Average number of events with one period lagged 
reduction in growth as percent of total number of 
events. 
15.2 20.3 
Average cut in government expenditure (percent).  -2.2  -6.8 
Average cut in government expenditure when there was 
a parallel reduction in growth (percent).  -4.0 -10.3 
Parallel reduction in growth — average percent of change 
in GDP.  -2.0 -5.2 
(*) Number of emerging countries in which data for total government expenditure is 
available and consistent. (**)
 Each year in the group of consecutive years is counted as 
an event. Source: OECD and Government Financial Statistics. 
 
3.2.2 A CHANGE IN POLICY AFTER THE 90S 
 
Another feature is to examine whether there was a change in the emerging 
markets government behavior after the 90s, when the globalization increased, allowing 
the emerging countries' governments to be exposed to international markets. This is 
indeed an important point: in order to cause a change in behavior and avoid emerging 
countries to be “on their own” (by cutting expenditure), agents must be convinced that 
in hard times there will be some kind of insurance through aid from other countries. If 
the stock exchange is exposed to citizens from other countries, and if there is confidence 
that countries will recover in the future, the low prices at the stock exchange during 10
hard times will be perceived as an investment opportunity and may provide such a 
mechanism.  
 
For this purpose we define a dummy variable (D90) that takes the value of 1 
after 1990, and 0 otherwise. We multiply this dummy to the fiscal variables explained 
above.  
 
3.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
 
Results for total government expenditure are shown in table 2. From column 2 
we learn that while for the developed economies the coefficient of permanent shocks is 
insignificant, for emerging markets the coefficients is around 0.3 and significant at 1 
percent. In hard times (column 4) the coefficient becomes higher: the coefficient in 
periods of parallel reductions in G and Y increases by 0.2. We take these results as first 
evidence of our main hypothesis — i.e., GDP shocks in emerging countries are associated 
to a procyclical reaction in government expenditure. These results are confirmed using 
the other methods as well. 
 
In columns 3 and 5 we test whether there was a change in behavior in emerging 
countries' government expenditure during the 90s, a period characterized by increasing 
globalization. In column 3 the coefficient is not significant but in column 5 it is 
significant at the 5 percent level; i.e., the emerging countries' procyclical reaction in 
government expenditure was significantly reduced since the nineties, especially during 
hard times.  
 
3.4 GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE COMPOSITION 
 
We perform the same analysis for government consumption, transfers and 
subsidies and capital expenditure. In the transfers and subsidies analysis, we additionally 
control for the difference of the unemployment rate (dU), in order to control for the 
automatic impact of the cycle on unemployment benefits. Results are shown in tables 3, 
4, and 5.  
 
In table 3, we see that while government consumption is procyclical in both 
developed and emerging economies, procyclicality is considerably higher in emerging 
economies. As opposed to total government expenditure, the behavior does not 
significantly change in hard times. In table 4, we see that government transfers are 
procyclical in emerging economies, a pattern that was accentuated during the 90s.   
 
A documented empirical result (Lane, 2003; and Ilzetzky and Vègh, 2008) is that 
capital expenditure tends to be procyclical even in a sample of developed economies. 
Lane (2003) summarizes both the macroeconomic and political economy factors that are 
on the background of this phenomenon. One possible explanation that connects between 
these two features would be that the fruits of investment projects is revealed many years 
after the initiation of a project; thus, politicians may be tempted to start investment 
projects only in times of abundant tax revenues, and at the same time they may find 
natural to cut these projects in difficult times — without any immediate consequences. In 
table 5 results show, as expected, that cuts in capital expenditure are procyclical in both 
developed and emerging economies. It is possible to see also that the procyclical behavior 
is not significantly different in emerging economies.  
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Table 2.  Total Government Expenditure Regressions. 
Dependent variable: dlog(G)  1  2  3  4  5 
No. of observations (unbalanced)  1221  1221  1221  1221  1221 
Sample  1971-2006 
Constant  0.06  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
dlog(POP)  1.64  1.37  1.37  1.38  1.47 
   (0.44)***  (0.45)***  (0.45)***  (0.45)***  (0.45)*** 
POP15+POP65  -0.001  0.00001  -0.00002  0.0002  -0.0001 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
RATIO  -0.004  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.003 
   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
HyperInfl  -0.05  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02 
   (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*  (0.01) 
K   -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.01)**  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)*  (0.01) 
EMERGING     -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02 
      (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)*  (0.01) 
  GY            -0.002  -0.01 
            (0.01)  (0.01) 
CITT  0.25  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.09 
   (0.04)***  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)*  (0.05)* 
 EMERGING CITT      0.31  0.31  0.35  0.43 
      (0.07)***  (0.09)***  (0.07)***  (0.08)*** 
 90 EMERGING CITT D         -0.004     -0.15 
         (0.07)     (0.07)** 
   EMERGING CITT G Y            0.22  0.23 
            (0.11)*  (0.12)* 
    90 EMERGING CITT G Y D               -0.51 
               (0.25)** 
Adj. R
2  0.54  0.56  0.56  0.55  0.56 
Durbin-Watson  1.63  1.66  1.66  1.67  1.66 
Notes. Estimation method: GMM. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 





















Table 3. Government Consumption Regressions. 
Dependent variable: dlog(GC)  1  2  3  4  5 
No. of observations (unbalanced)  1277  1277  1277  1202  1202 
Sample  1971-2006 
Constant  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
dlog(POP)  1.03  0.98  0.98  1.15  1.13 
   (0.42)**  (0.42)**  (0.42)**  (0.44)***  (0.44)***
POP15+POP65  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.001 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
RATIO  0.01  0.004  0.004  0.01  0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
HyperInfl  -0.05  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03 
   (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)**  (0.01)** 
K   -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 
   (0.01)**  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)**  (0.01)** 
EMERGING     -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
      (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)**  (0.01)** 
  GY            -0.003  -0.002 
            (0.01)  (0.01) 
CITT  0.24  0.15  0.15  0.16  0.16 
   (0.03)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)***
 EMERGING CITT      0.17  0.19  0.28  0.34 
      (0.07)**  (0.08)**  (0.07)***  (0.08)***
 90 EMERGING CITT D         -0.03     -0.10 
         (0.07)     (0.07) 
   EMERGING CITT G Y            0.08  0.09 
            (0.11)  (0.12) 
    90 EMERGING CITT G Y D               0.07 
               (0.26) 
Adj. R
2  0.56  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.57 
Durbin-Watson  1.73  1.76  1.76  1.76  1.76 
Notes. Estimation method: GMM. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent. Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 4.  Government Transfers and Subsidies Regressions. 
Dependent variable: dlog(GT)  1  2  3  4  5 
No. of observations (unbalanced)  1062  1062  1062  1053  1053 
Sample  1971-2006 
Constant  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.004 
   (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
dlog(POP)  1.61  1.48  1.49  1.22  1.19 
   (0.64)**  (0.68)**  (0.7)**  (0.69)*  (0.7)* 
POP15+POP65  -0.0003  0.0004  0.001  0.001  0.001 
   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
RATIO  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
HyperInfl  -0.07  -0.06  -0.07  -0.05  -0.05 
   (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)**  (0.02)*** 
dU  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***  (0.002)***
K   -0.01  0.001  -0.003  0.002  -0.001 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
EMERGING     -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02 
      (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
  GY            -0.02  -0.02 
            (0.01)**  (0.01)** 
CITT  0.12  -0.02  -0.01  -0.04  -0.03 
   (0.06)**  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
 EMERGING CITT      0.29  -0.01  0.30  0.09 
      (0.11)***  (0.13)  (0.11)***  (0.13) 
 90 EMERGING CITT D         0.49     0.33 
         (0.13)***     (0.12)*** 
   EMERGING CITT G Y            0.20  0.34 
            (0.2)  (0.22) 
    90 EMERGING CITT G Y D               -0.06 
               (0.59) 
Adj. R
2  0.43  0.45  0.43  0.45  0.44 
Durbin-Watson  1.60  1.63  1.64  1.62  1.63 
Notes. Estimation method: GMM. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 



















Table 5. Government Capital Expenditure Regressions. 
Dependent variable: dlog(GI)  1  2  3  4  5 
No. of observations (unbalanced)  1245  1245  1245  1177  1177 
Sample  1971-2006 
Constant  0.05  0.15  0.15  0.13  0.14 
   (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
dlog(POP)  3.72  4.35  4.35  4.63  4.66 
   (1.16)***  (1.19)***  (1.19)***  (1.2)***  (1.21)***
POP15+POP65  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
RATIO  0.06  -0.09  -0.09  -0.10  -0.10 
   (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)*  (0.06)* 
HyperInfl  -0.07  -0.06  -0.06  -0.04  -0.05 
   (0.03)**  (0.03)*  (0.03)**  (0.03)  (0.03) 
K   -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)**  (0.02)** 
EMERGING     -0.12  -0.11  -0.15  -0.14 
      (0.04)***  (0.04)***  (0.04)***  (0.04)***
  GY            -0.01  -0.02 
            (0.01)  (0.01) 
CITT  0.60  0.48  0.49  0.49  0.49 
   (0.09)***  (0.14)***  (0.14)***  (0.14)***  (0.14)***
 EMERGING CITT      0.22  0.15  0.30  0.22 
      (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.18)*  (0.22) 
 90 EMERGING CITT D         0.04     0.01 
         (0.18)     (0.18) 
   EMERGING CITT G Y            0.15  0.07 
            (0.31)  (0.33) 
    90 EMERGING CITT G Y D               -0.23 
               (0.69) 
Adj. R
2  0.54  0.54  0.54  0.54  0.55 
Durbin-Watson  1.81  1.80  1.80  1.79  1.79 
Notes. Estimation method: GMM. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
3.5 OTHER ISSUES TO CONSIDER 
 
So far we found that fiscal policy in emerging countries is procyclical, with some 
signs of a change in behavior after the nineties. In this sub-section we explore other issues 
that may shed lights on the mechanism underlying this process.  
 
3.5.1. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
 
One possibility for the improved performance in the nineties is that countries are 
less “on their own” and the need for cutting expenditure in hard times has been reduced 
in countries increasingly exposed to investors around the world. One possible indicator of 
this exposure is the level of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). Thus, we expect that 
countries that have a high level of FDI will be characterized by milder procyclical fiscal 





Table 6. Average Net FDI Inflows as Percent of GDP. 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-2006
Developed countries 0.74 0.75 1.97 3.78 
Emerging countries 0.83 0.84 2.53 2.96 
All countries 0.79 0.79 2.26 3.36 
Source: UNCTAD, May 2010. 
 
One clear feature arising from this table is that after the nineties there was a 
huge increase in globalization compared to the 70s and 80s, with a more than double 
(quadruple) FDI level in the 90s (2001-06) for developed economies, and more than triple 
(quadruple in 2001-06) for emerging markets. Another interesting feature of FDI flows is 
their high variance, with some developing countries being “discovered” by foreign 
investors only in the last decade.  
 
In table 7 we check whether the level of FDI has some explanatory power for 
procyclical fiscal policy in emerging countries. For this purpose we perform two 
regressions: (i) using an interaction variable between CITT and FDI (column 1); (ii) 
using an interaction between CITT and a dummy variable ( () D FDI ) that takes the value 
of 1 when FDI is higher than the median for each group of countries in each decade or 0 
otherwise (column 2). Results are significant and in the expected direction; for emerging 
countries with high levels of FDI the coefficient of procyclicality decreases from 0.42 to 
0.14 (column 2).  
 
Kandil and Morsy (2010) found that international reserves help for performing 
countercyclical policy in emerging countries. We use their methodology for testing the 
role of international reserves and build a dummy variable ( (Reserves) D ) that takes the 
value 1 if the international reserves at the end of the year are higher than the sum of 3 
months of imports (using average monthly imports of the corresponding year). Columns 






















Table 7. Total Government Expenditure Regressions with  
FDI and International Reserves. 
Dependent variable: dlog(G)  1  2  3  4 
No. of observations (unbalanced)  1130  1170  1195  1195 
Sample  1973-2006  1971-2006 
Constant  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.04 
   (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
dlog(POP)  1.55  1.40  1.45  1.45 
   (0.5)***  (0.49)***  (0.45)***  (0.45)*** 
POP15+POP65  -0.001  -0.001  -0.0003  -0.0003 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
RATIO  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
   (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
HyperInfl  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
   (0.01)**  (0.01)**  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
K   -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)*  (0.01)* 
EMERGING  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)*  (0.01)* 
FDI/GDP  -0.001          
   (0.001)          
() DF D I      -0.0002       
      (0.01)       
D(Reserves)        0.01  0.01 
         (0.003)*  (0.003)* 
CITT  0.06  0.09  0.10  0.10 
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)**  (0.05)** 
 EMERGING CITT   0.39  0.42  0.38  0.38 
   (0.08)***  (0.09)***  (0.09)***  (0.09)*** 
 (/ ) FDI GDP EMERGING CITT   -0.04          
   (0.02)***          
 (FDI) EMERGING CITT D      -0.28       
      (0.09)***       
 (Reserves) EMERGING CITT D         -0.13  -0.13 
        (0.07)*  (0.08)* 
  (Reserves) 90 EMERGING CITT D D            0.01 
           (0.08) 
Adj. R
2  0.55  0.54  0.55  0.55 
Durbin-Watson  1.68  1.67  1.66  1.66 
Notes. Estimation method: GMM. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
3.5.2 GOVERNMENT DEBT 
 
As mentioned in the literature survey, government debt is considered as one of 
the main explicators for procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries. Two stylized 
facts are that in many emerging countries the levels of debt are high, and that there is a 
high variability of debt levels among different countries. 
 
In table 8 we estimate regressions that include the level of debt as an 
independent variable ( / DEBT GDP ), and a dummy variable ( () D Debt ) that takes the 
value of 1 when the debt is higher than the median for each group of countries in each 
decade or 0 otherwise (column 3). Column 1 shows that the coefficient of debt as a 
percent of GDP is negative and significant, which means that countries with high debt 17
tend to reduce government expenditure. This means that debt can be considered as an 
alternative explanation for government expenditure. Consequently, we include debt as an 
additional variable in our basic specification, and we further create an interaction 
variable between CITT and debt. Ex-ante we do not have a clear expectation about the 
sign of the coefficient: a high level of debt may imply an international pressure to cut, 
and thus we shall expect a negative coefficient; on the other hand, a high level of debt 
may represent the ability of countries to access international capital markets, which 
implies a positive coefficient. In columns 2 and 3 we see that the coefficients tend to be 
negative but in the second specification it is not significant.  
 
Table 8: Total Government Expenditure Regressions with Debt. 
Dependent variable: dlog(G)  1  2  3 
No. of observations (unbalanced)  900  894  963 
Sample  1973-2006 
Constant  0.07  0.04  -0.01 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
dlog(POP)  0.46  0.65  1.05 
   (0.48)  (0.46)  (0.48)** 
POP15+POP65  -0.0002  0.0002  0.0001 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
RATIO  -0.02  0.002  0.04 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
HyperInfl  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
K      0.01  0.001 
      (0.01)  (0.01) 
EMERGING  0.04  -0.01  0.02 
   (0.02)**  (0.01)  (0.01) 
DEBT/GDP  -0.0004  -0.0004    
   (0.0001)***  (0.0001)***    
() DD e b t        -0.003 
         (0.004) 
CITT     0.01  0.05 
      (0.04)  (0.05) 
 EMERGING CITT      0.39  0.25 
      (0.1)***  (0.08)*** 
 (/ ) DEBT GDP EMERGING   -0.001       
   (0.0002)***       
 (/ ) DEBT GDP EMERGING CITT      -0.004    
      (0.002)**    
 (Debt) EMERGING CITT D         -0.13 
         (0.100) 
Adj. R
2  0.59  0.59  0.58 
Durbin-Watson  1.66  1.59  1.53 
Notes. Estimation method: GMM. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
3.5.3 EMERGING VS DEVELOPING 
 
In our sample there are five markets that are not considered “Emerging Markets” 
by either the MSCI or FTSE emerging markets index (see appendix F for further 
information of the countries included in these indices). Table 9 repeats the regressions 
reported in table 3 excluding the following countries: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican 18
Republic, Panama and Uruguay. Interestingly, we found the coefficient of procyclicality 
is lower for the restricted sample. 
 
Table 9. Total Government Expenditure Regressions Excluding Five Developing Markets 
Not Included in the “Emerging Markets Index”. 
Dependent variable: dlog(G)  1  2  3  4  5 
No. of observations (unbalanced)  1107  1107  1107  1107  1107 
Sample  1971-2006 
Constant  0.07  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.05 
   (0.04)*  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
dlog(POP)  1.53  1.32  1.32  1.36  1.39 
   (0.44)***  (0.46)***  (0.46)***  (0.45)***  (0.44)*** 
POP15+POP65  -0.001  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0004 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
RATIO  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
HyperInfl  -0.06  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03 
   (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)**  (0.01)** 
K   -0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.01)**  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
EMERGING     -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 
      (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
  GY            -0.01  -0.02 
            (0.01)  (0.01)*** 
CITT  0.21  0.06  0.06  0.09  0.09 
   (0.04)***  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)*  (0.05)* 
 EMERGING CITT      0.29  0.28  0.25  0.31 
      (0.08)***  (0.09)***  (0.07)***  (0.08)*** 
 90 EMERGING CITT D         -0.01     -0.08 
         (0.07)     (0.07) 
   EMERGING CITT G Y            0.18  0.21 
            (0.13)  (0.13) 
   90 EMERGING CITT G Y D               -0.63 
               (0.23)*** 
Adj. R
2  0.55  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56 
Durbin-Watson  1.73  1.75  1.75  1.75  1.73 
Notes. Estimation method: GMM. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper checks whether developed and emerging economies react differently to 
persistent shocks to output. Using a simple model of optimal government behavior we 
expect that countries that are subject to persistent shocks to per-capita GDP shall act 
procyclical; i.e., increase expenditure during booms and cut it during recessions. In order 
to assess the extent at which “the cycle is the trend” for developed and emerging 
economies, we adopt Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) definition of shocks, and we check the 
reaction of government expenditure and its components (consumption, transfers and 
investment) to these shocks.  
 
We found that while government expenditure in developed economies is not affected 
by these shocks, emerging countries tend to pursue procyclical fiscal policy as a reaction 
to persistent shocks to per-capita GDP. While in line with previous findings both 19
developed and emerging countries act procyclical regarding investment expenditure, 
procyclical policy in emerging countries is particularly evident for total expenditure and 
is implemented also in government consumption and transfers.  
 
After the 90s, during a period of increasing globalization, there are signs of a 
reduction in the extent of procyclical expenditure policy in emerging countries. 
Moreover, it was found that countries with a high level of FDI, and those included in 
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Choosing the Length of Shocks Affecting Government Expenditure. 
 
The interaction between the sum of the three period shocks and “the cycle is the 
trend” is a central explanatory variable in our regressions. As stated in Aguiar and 
Gopinath (2007), there is a trade off between precision (using a small number for K) and 
an unbiased sample (using a large K).  
 
Choosing different values of K implies a different pattern for the CITT variable. 
The following figure shows the relative variance of the random walk component at 
K=11. Clearly in this figure there is a sharper distinction concerning the random walk 
component of developed and emerging markets, compared to the one arising from figure 
2 (which is based on the average K). 
 









































































































































































































































































































































Average Emerging Markets: 1.66
Average Developed Markets: 1.21
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In order to check the sensitivity of results to K we run the following regression: 
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where K takes different values and j goes from 1 to 4. 
 
Results for the four different possibilities of accumulated shocks show that the 
best result using the t-statistic, adjusted R
2 and Akaike criterion occurs when K=2. At 
the same time, it is remarkable that differences between the regressions, as measured by 
the adjusted R
2 and Akaike criterion, are negligible. Since choosing K=2 would clearly 23
increase the potential bias of our estimation, we choose the average K as an option that 
balances between precision and bias. It is worth to note that the t-statistic for the 
regression using average K is very high (t=9), and the difference in the level of 
significance is negligible when compared to the case in which K=2.     
 
Our second choice is related to the length of the moving average of output 
shocks. In the three-periods accumulated shocks specification of the above equation, we 
get a significantly higher t-statistic of the CITT variable, and higher adjusted R
2 and 
Akaike criterion (in absolute value) compared to all other options. Therefore, we choose 
this option as the benchmark. 
 
In order to check the sensibility of results to the different values of K, we show in 
this appendix the results of the following main regression (as presented in table 3, 
column 2):   
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For space considerations we show only the coefficients and significance of the 
main variables, the adjusted R
2 and Durbin-Watson value at table A1. 24
 
 
Table A1. Coefficients and Statistics of the Main Variables. 
  CITT   CITT EMERGING Adj. R
2  Durbin-Watson 
K=2  0.02  (0.05)  0.29  (0.07)***  0.57  1.67 
K=3  0.03  (0.04)  0.24  (0.06)***  0.57  1.67 
K=4  0.04  (0.04)  0.2  (0.05)***  0.56  1.66 
K=5  0.06  (0.04)  0.17  (0.05)***  0.56  1.66 
K=6  0.06  (0.04)*  0.15  (0.05)***  0.55  1.65 
K=7  0.07  (0.04)*  0.13  (0.05)***  0.55  1.65 
K=8  0.07  (0.03)**  0.13  (0.04)***  0.55  1.65 
K=9  0.07  (0.03)**  0.12  (0.04)***  0.55  1.65 
K=10  0.06  (0.03)**  0.13  (0.04)***  0.55  1.65 
K=11  0.07  (0.03)**  0.15  (0.04)***  0.55  1.65 
K=12  0.07  (0.03)**  0.16  (0.04)***  0.55  1.65 
K=13  0.07  (0.03)**  0.17  (0.04)***  0.55  1.66 
K=14  0.07  (0.03)**  0.19  (0.05)***  0.55  1.67 
K=15  0.07  (0.03)**  0.22  (0.05)***  0.56  1.67 
K=16  0.08  (0.03)**  0.24  (0.05)***  0.56  1.68 
K=17  0.08  (0.03)**  0.27  (0.06)***  0.55  1.67 
K=18  0.08  (0.04)**  0.31  (0.07)***  0.55  1.67 
K=19  0.08  (0.04)*  0.35  (0.07)***  0.54  1.66 
K=20  0.09  (0.05)*  0.36  (0.08)***  0.54  1.64 
K=21  0.1  (0.05)*  0.35  (0.08)***  0.53  1.63 
K=22  0.1  (0.06)*  0.34  (0.08)***  0.53  1.63 
K=23  0.1  (0.06)  0.34  (0.08)***  0.53  1.63 
K=24  0.12  (0.07)*  0.32  (0.09)***  0.52  1.62 
K=25  0.17  (0.08)*  0.28  (0.1)***  0.51  1.61 
K=26  0.22  (0.09)**  0.3  (0.11)***  0.51  1.61 
K=27  0.25  (0.1)**  0.39  (0.12)***  0.52  1.63 
K=28  0.23  (0.1)**  0.66  (0.14)***  0.55  1.69 
K=29  0.17  (0.09)*  0.64  (0.13)***  0.55  1.71 
K=30  0.16  (0.08)*  0.55  (0.12)***  0.55  1.72 
 KK   0.08  (0.05)  0.31  (0.07)***  0.56  1.66 
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 
percent; * significant at 10 percent. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Similarly, we run the regressions with different number of accumulated shocks 
(using   KK ).  The table A2 shows results for the specification described above.  
 
Table A2. Regressions with Accumulated Shocks. 
No. of Acc. Shocks  CITT   CITT EMERGING  Adj. R
2  Durbin-Watson
1  -0.09  (0.09)  -0.05  (0.13)  0.50  1.65 
2  -0.12  (0.07)*  0.44  (0.1)***  0.54  1.72 
3  0.08  (0.05)  0.31  (0.07)***  0.56  1.66 
4  0.15  (0.04)***  0.18  (0.06)***  0.53  1.71 
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 
percent; * significant at 10 percent. Source: Own elaboration. 25
Appendix B 
Granger Causality Test 
 
In this appendix we use Granger causality tests for the relationship between GDP 
per capita and government expenditure. At first, we test whether GDP per capita causes 
government expenditure (with three lags). Then, we test again this hypothesis after 
adding fixed effects for the different countries. At last, we run a full regression including 
all the control variables used in our paper (dlog(POP), POP15+POP65, HyperInfl, 
RATIO). The null hypothesis is that each of the coefficients of GDP per capita up to 
three lags equals 0. In all three specifications the null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
To check reverse causality, we test all three specifications replacing the 
dependent variable by GDP per capita. The null hypothesis is that each of the 
coefficients of government expenditure up to three lags equals 0. The null hypothesis can 
not be rejected in all three specifications at 5 percent significance. The table A3 
summarizes the results.   
 
Table A3. Results of Granger Causality Tests. 



















F-statistic  14.0 11.4 14.2 1.87 1.96 2.19
Significant at  under 1%  under 1% under 1% 14% 12%  9%
Result 
The null 
hypnosis c can 
be rejected 
The null 
hypnosis c can 
be rejected 
The null 
hypnosis c can 
be rejected 
The null 




hypnosis c can 
not be rejected 
The null 





Using Alternative Instruments 
 
In this section we discuss the sensitivity of results to our basic instrumental 
variable - the logarithmic change in countries’' exports at constant dollars. Since our 
instrumental variable is based on a three-years moving average (consistently with the 
length chosen for the explanatory variable), note that it is centered at a one year and a 
half lag. This feature avoids a contemporary endogeneity with the left-hand variable 
(logarithmic change of government expenditure) through the exchange-rate channel.
6 
However, since the last year of the moving average is contemporary to the left-hand side 
variable, we check in this appendix the sensitivity of results to an alternative 
instrumental variable — based on the one-period lagged moving average.  
 
Table A4 shows the results for total government expenditure, government 
consumption, transfers and capital expenditure — according to the regression specification 
shown in the last column of table 3. 
 
The obtained results show a similar pattern compared to the ones shown in Table 
3: emerging economies have a clearly more procyclical pattern for total government 
expenditure and government consumption than developed economies (although here the 
coefficient of total expenditure for this group of countries is significant), transfers are 
procyclical in hard times, and capital expenditure is procyclical for both groups.  
 
In table A5 we use an alternative instrumental variable, introduced by Panizza 
and Jaimovich (2007) and used also by Ilzetzki and Vègh (2008). It is based on the 
weighted average of real GDP growth of the main export partners.
7 Since the availability 
of data shortens considerably our sample from 1983 and onwards, we are constrained to 
use the regressions shown in column 3 (i.e., excluding the dummy after the nineties) of 
Tables 3, 4 and 5. Also here results are fairly similar, except for a significant procyclical 





                                                
6  This channel would be relevant to the extent that government expenditure affects the real 
exchange rate and that real exchange rate affects exports. Existing empirical literature on the 
relationship between government expenditure and real exchange rate shows a contemporary 
correlation between these two variables: see De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994), Lee, 
Milesi-Ferretti and Ricci (2008) and Galstyan and Lane (2008); the last two papers use a dynamic 
specification with one-lag and one-forward period; i.e., they are centered on the contemporaneous 
correlation. 
7 Main export partners of a country are defined as the countries that receive at least 5% of the 
total exports. The second criterion requires that the main export partners comprise at least 50% 
of the countries exports. If countries receiving more than 5% of the exports do not account for 
50% of the total exports smaller trading partners are added. For example, a country that has only 
one export partner that accounts for over 50 percent of its total exports (such as Canada and 
Mexico) will have only one main export partner in our calculation. Other countries that have less 
centralized export characteristics can have six or seven main trading partners, where some of 
them account for less then 5 percent of total exports.  The weighted average of the GDP growth 
rate is based on the export partners' weights in the total exports. We normalized the weights so 





Table A4. Total Government Expenditure and its Composition. 
Dependent variable:   dlog(G)  dlog(GC)  dlog(GT)  dlog(GI) 
No. of observations (unbalanced)  1217  1198  1049  1173 
Sample  1971-2006 
Constant  0.04  -0.02  0.003  0.18 
   (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.12) 
dlog(POP)  1.91  1.42  1.47  5.66 
   (0.48)*** (0.45)*** (0.69)**  (1.31)***
POP15+POP65  -0.0003  0.001  0.001  -0.002 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) 
RATIO  0.002  0.004  -0.004  -0.11 
   (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)* 
HyperInfl  -0.01  -0.01  -0.05  -0.04 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)***  (0.03) 
dU      0.01   
  (0.002)***   
K   -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.08 
   (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01) (0.02)***
EMERGING  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.14 
   (0.02) (0.01)** (0.02) (0.04)***
  GY   -0.01  0.001  -0.02  -0.02 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
CITT  0.26  0.27  0.02  0.89 
   (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.08) (0.18)***
 EMERGING CITT   0.38  0.36  0.08  0.01 
   (0.1)*** (0.09)*** (0.13) (0.26) 
 90 EMERGING CITT D   -0.18  -0.12  0.16  -0.06 
   (0.07)*** (0.07)* (0.11) (0.19) 
   EMERGING CITT G Y   0.22  0.17  0.52  -0.12 
   (0.12)* (0.12) (0.2)***  (0.31) 
    90 EMERGING CITT D G Y   -0.62  -0.16  -0.08  -0.46 
   (0.24)*** (0.24) (0.57) (0.64) 
Adj. R
2  0.52  0.54  0.45  0.52 
Durbin-Watson  1.63  1.74  1.66  1.76 
Notes. Estimation method: GMM. Instrumental variable: Constant dollar exports with 
one year lag. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 percent; ** significant 


















Table A6. Total Government Expenditure and its Composition. 
Dependent variable:   dlog(G)  dlog(GC)  dlog(GT)  dlog(GI) 
No. of observations (unbalanced)  878  863  843  762 
Sample  1983-2006 
Constant  0.11  0.05  0.04  0.32 
   (0.05)** (0.06) (0.08)  (0.14)**
dlog(POP)  1.63  1.72  1.37  4.75 
   (0.59)*** (0.66)*** (0.89)  (1.56)***
POP15+POP65  -0.01  -0.002  -0.01  -0.13 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.07)*
RATIO  -0.02  -0.04  -0.06  -0.03 
   (0.01)* (0.01)*** (0.02)***  (0.04)
dU        0.01    
   (0.002)*** 
HyperInfl  -0.02  -0.02  -0.002  -0.06 
  (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)  (0.02)***
K   -0.01  -0.004  -0.02  -0.02 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02)
EMERGING  -0.01  -0.03  0.0003  -0.11 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04)***
  GY   -0.01  -0.004  -0.02  -0.02 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02)
CITT  0.18  0.24  0.03  0.59 
   (0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)  (0.15)***
 EMERGING CITT   0.26  0.27  0.30  0.23 
   (0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.13)**  (0.21)
   EMERGING CITT G Y   -0.06  -0.16  0.11  -0.15 
   (0.13) (0.12) (0.25)  (0.38)
Adj. R
2  0.50  0.55  0.43  0.48 
Durbin-Watson  1.60  1.72  1.65  1.84 
Notes. Estimation method: GMM. Instrumental variable: Weighted average of real GDP 
growth of the main export partners (normalized so that weights sum-up to 1) multiplied 
by exports as percent of GDP.     Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 













Appendix D  
Using Country Fixed Effects 
 
Controlling for the random walk component in the main regressions technically 
impedes us from using country fixed effects.  In this appendix we check the sensitivity of 
substituting the random walk component by country fixed effects, using different values 
of K. This test is performed using the specification in column 5 of table 3; results shown 
in table A6 confirm our main hypothesis. 
   
Table A6. Using Country Fixed Effects. 
Dependent variable: dlog(G)  1  2  3  4 
Values of K  K=7  K=9  K=11   K K
No. of observations  1217  1217  1217  1217 
Sample  1971-2006 
Constant  -0.11  -0.12  -0.14  -0.13 
   (0.06)* (0.06)** (0.06)**  (0.06)**
dlog(POP)  1.56  1.49  1.44  1.69 
   (0.63)** (0.61)** (0.61)**  (0.65)***
POP15+POP65  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002 
   (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)**  (0.001)*
RATIO  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)*  (0.05)
HyperInfl  -0.03  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02 
   (0.01)** (0.01)* (0.02)  (0.01)
  GY   -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)
CITT  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.19 
   (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.05)**  (0.08)**
 EMERGING CITT   0.21  0.20  0.29  0.46 
   (0.08)*** (0.07)*** (0.08)***  (0.12)***
 90 EMERGING CITT D   -0.10  -0.09  -0.10  -0.16 
   (0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)**  (0.07)**
   EMERGING CITT G Y   0.16  0.16  0.14  0.21 
   (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.07)**  (0.12)*
    90 EMERGING CITT D G Y   -0.28  -0.33  -0.41  -0.60 
   (0.18) (0.17)** (0.18)**  (0.25)**
Adj. R
2  0.53  0.53  0.52  0.53 
Durbin-Watson  1.63  1.63  1.62  1.62 
Notes. Estimation method: GMM. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1 




Appendix E  
Arellano-Bond-type regressions 
 
In this appendix we consider the possible endogeneity arising from the effect of 
government expenditure on GDP. For this purpose we estimate the regressions presented 
in table 3 with a dynamic Arellano-Bond method, using the dynamic instrument for the 
CITT variable (dlog(real exports)) with two-years lag. Results are shown in table A7 
and they confirm our main results. 
 
Table A7. An Arellano-Bond Specification. 
Dependent variable: dlog(G)  1  2  3  4  5 
No. of observations  1240  1223  1223  1223  1223 
Sample  1971-2006 
dlog(POP)  1.71  1.61  1.49  1.59  1.95 
   (0.08)*** (0.1)*** (0.1)*** (0.12)***  (0.36)***
POP15+POP65  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.003 
   (0.0004)* (0.0003)* (0.0003)* (0.001)** (0.001)**
RATIO  0.08  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.07 
   (0.02)*** (0.04)* (0.04)* (0.04)*  (0.09)
HyperInfl  -0.14  -0.09  -0.09  -0.05  -0.17 
   (0.1) (0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)  (0.79)
CITT  0.12  0.01  -0.001  0.01  -0.01 
   (0.01)*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02)
 EMERGING CITT      0.26  0.31  0.20  0.22 
   (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***  (0.02)***
 90 EMERGING CITT D         -0.06     -0.28 
   (0.01)***    (0.77)
   EMERGING CITT G Y            0.58  0.53 
   (0.06)***  (0.01)***
    90 EMERGING CITT D G Y               -1.83 
     (3.0)
Hansen J-statistic  37.32  36.47  34.62  37.44  35.71 
















Notes. Estimation method: Dynamic Arellano-Bond. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** 














 Appendix F 
Classification of Emerging Markets, Data Coverage and Source. 
 
In the regressions we base our analysis on 22 developed economies (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
Switzerland, UK, USA) and 23 emerging markets (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uruguay and Venezuela). The choice of emerging markets is based on two indices (as 
defined at the end of our sample period; 2006): MSCI and FTSE. 
 
The MSCI Emerging Markets Index includes the following countries (the 
countries in bold are included in our sample): A Argentina, Brazil,   Chile, China, C Colombia, 
Czech Republic, ,  Egypt,  Hungary,  India,  Indonesia,  Israel, Jordan,    Korea,  Malaysia, 
Mexico, Morocco,  Pakistan,  Peru, Philippines, ,  Poland, ,  Russia, , South  Africa, Taiwan, , 
Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela. The countries that are not in bold (excluding Israel) 
are not included due to insufficient data on government expenditure for the full sample 
period. Israel is excluded from the sample since Israel has been “upgraded” to a 
“developed market” classification.
8 On the other hand, Argentina, Pakistan and 
Venezuela have been “downgraded” from the Emerging Markets Index since 2006, but 
they are still included in our sample.  
 
The FTSE Emerging Markets Index is similar to the MSCI index except that it 
does not include Korea and Venezuela. Five countries are included in the sample and are 
not officially classified as emerging markets: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Panama and Uruguay.  
 
The following countries were dropped from some of the regressions: 
- Mexico was dropped from transfers and subsides and total expenditure because local 
government data was not available. For the government consumption and capital 
expenditure the data is available, so it was not dropped in those regressions. 
- Chile was dropped from regressions on government total expenditure and for 
transfers and subsidies since data on transfers between governments is not available 
- Colombia was dropped from the transfers and subsidies regressions since we did not 
have enough observations. 
 
                                                
8 Strawczynski and Zeira (2007) show that in fact fiscal policy in Israel has evolutes from strongly 
procyclical to mildly procyciclical after 1985. 32
Data Coverage and Source 
 
The data used in this research is taken from several databases. In the table below 
we summarize the sources for the different variables used.   
 





Markets  1960-2006  OECD Historical Statistics. 
Emerging Markets  1972-2006  GFS (IMF). 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product  1960-2006  OECD Historical Statistics, IFS (IMF)
and WDI (World Bank). 
RATIO  1960-2006   
The Conference Board and Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre, Total 
Economy Database (except for Panama 
for which data is taken from WDI for 
the period 1980-2006). 
POP15: Population (under 15 years old). 1960-2006 WDI.
POP65: Population (above 65 years old). 1960-2006 WDI.
FDI  1970-2006  UNCTAD and IFS to supplement data 





Markets 1970-2006  GFS and OECD Historical Statistics. 
Emerging Markets in 
Latin America, South 
Africa and Pakistan. 
1980-2004  Cowan et al. (2006). 
Rest of Emerging Markets  1972-2006  GFS supplemented with data from 
Panizza (2008). 
International Reserves and Imports  1960-2006  IFS. 
Exports Data 
Exports as % of GDP and 
in Constant Dollars.  1960-2006 WDI. 
Export Partners.  1980-2006  DOTS (IMF). 
(*) For some countries coverage is partial. Source: Own elaboration.  
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